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Abstract
Paisley Livingston claims that an artist’s intentions are successfully realized and
hence determinant of the meaning of a work if and only if they are compatible
and “mesh” with the linguistic and conventional meanings of the text or arte-
fact taken in its target or intended context. I argue that this specific standard of
success is not without its difficulties. First, I show how an artist’s intention can
sometimes be constitutive of a work’s meaning even if there is no significant
meshing between the artist’s intention and his work. Secondly, I argue against
the claim that the artist’s intentions need to be compatible with the linguistic
and conventional meanings of a text. Thirdly, I discuss a case that creates a par-
ticular puzzle for Livingston since the intentions of the artist concerned are not
successfully realized, though they are compatible and mesh with all the relevant
data. I conclude my paper by suggesting a solution to this puzzle.
The role of intention in the interpretation of art has been a topic of lively
debate in analytic aesthetics. Absolute intentionalism holds that a work’s
meaning and the artist’s intentions with regard to the work’s meaning are
logically equivalent. Absolute anti-intentionalism, by contrast, claims that
the artist’s intentions are never relevant with regard to a work’s meaning.
Both extreme positions still have advocates today, but most participants in
the debate seem convinced that an intermediary position is needed, explain-
ing how intentions are relevant but not solely determinant for work meaning.
Several moderate accounts have been proposed, but so far no consensus
has been reached. Moderate actual intentionalists contend that the inten-
tions relevant to the interpretation of a work of art are the actual intentions
of the pertinent artist, whereas hypothetical intentionalists claim that what is
relevant for interpretation is the best hypothesis, formulated by an appropri-
ate audience, of the actual artist’s intentions. A third account, fictionalist
intentionalism, holds that interpreters need not concern themselves with the
actual artist and should simply pretend that the intentions expressed in the
work are expressed by a fictional or postulated artistic persona.
One of the most noteworthy recent contributions to this debate is
Paisley Livingston’s Art and Intention (2005) in which an elaborate new ver-
sion of moderate actual intentionalism is delineated and defended. He calls
this view ‘partial intentionalism’, his account of which is complemented by
arguments against hypothetical and fictionalist intentionalism. On both levels,
Livingston does an outstanding job. His account of the role of intention
in interpretation is one of the most sophisticated and convincing to date,
and his critical evaluation of rival accounts is both fair and thorough.
Livingston has helped to make moderate actual intentionalism the best
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defended position in the debate, though he has not dispelled all of the diffi-
culties with this view. My aim in this paper is to bring some of these difficulties
to the fore. In the process, I also aim to show that, despite the current
antagonism, some insights and aspects of rival accounts, especially hypo-
thetical intentionalism, are worth keeping and can be of use to the actual
intentionalist. But first I will introduce the aspect of Livingston’s theory to
which my comments are most relevant.
I.
Moderate actual intentionalists claim that the artist’s intentions, if success-
fully realized, are partly constitutive of some of the work’s meanings. ‘A key
issue’, therefore, ‘hinges on the nature of the “success” condition to be
weighed on artists’ intentions’ (Livingston 2005: xiii). When exactly are
intentions successfully realized and hence determinant of the meaning of a
work? Different proponents of moderate actual intentionalism have answered
this question in different ways.
According to Gary Iseminger, the meaning of the work ‘is the meaning
compatible with the text [original emphasis] that the author intended’
(Iseminger 1996: 321). If one discovers that the author had some meaning in
mind that is incompatible with the text, one must conclude that he has failed
to realize his intention. However compelling, this ‘compatibility view’ seems
to have some undesirable consequences. Imagine, Livingston says, the
Japanese novelist Soseki giving an interview in which he sincerely and accu-
rately reveals his intention that the three main characters in his trilogy of
novels, Sanshiro (1908), And Then (1909) and The Gate (1910), were meant to
be the successive appearances of a Martian in disguise. This Martian story-
line seems ‘tacked on’ and extraneous. Most if not all readers would have
failed to think of it had they not read the interview. Still, such a reading is
compatible with the textual evidence. Would we not in this particular case be
justified in denying the correctness of the Martian reading of the story?
‘Clearly’, Livingston writes, ‘if no features of the novel’s characterization res-
onate with the Martian intention, the latter could be discounted’ (Livingston
2005: 155). So, ‘being consistent or compatible with the data’ will not suffice
as a success condition. A more substantial criterion is needed.
One such criterion can be found in Robert Stecker’s book, Interpretation
and Construction. ‘An utterance does mean what a speaker intends’, Stecker
claims, ‘if the intention is apt to be recognized in part because of the con-
ventional meaning of the words used, or of a context that extends those
meanings’ (Stecker 2003: 14). In other words, intentions do not merely
have to be compatible with the data, they also have to be ‘capable of uptake’
by properly prepared receivers.
Livingston, though not unsympathetic to a proposal of this sort, cannot
subscribe to it because ‘[s]ometimes the author’s semantic intentions are
less limited than the meanings a reader may be able to dream up on the
basis of the text and other background evidence. Sometimes interviews and
diaries open up all sorts of wonderful undiscovered meanings’ (Livingston
2005: 164). An uptake view of work meaning cannot take this into account.
Thus, the question remains: when exactly are intentions successfully
realized in a work? With Stecker’s uptake condition being too strong and
Iseminger’s compatibility condition too weak, Livingston proposes a via
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media with the default standard of success ‘being simply that the intentions
are compatible and “mesh” with the linguistic and conventional meanings
of the text or artefact taken in its target or intended context’ (Livingston
2005: 155). The crucial term in this formula is ‘mesh’, but Livingston is
somewhat evasive about its precise meaning. Speaking about the Soseki
example, he only says that the partial intentionalist would accept the new
reading if the peculiar authorial clue resonates with or ‘opens up previously
undetected connotations of various features of the text’ (Livingston 2005: 155).
Later in the book, he tries to be more specific:
Meshing…means ‘be consistent with’, but also carries the implication of a
stronger condition involving relevance and integration: if there is a sense in
which an extraneous hypothesis is consistent with data, but bears no mean-
ingful, integrative relation with them, we would say that the two do not mesh.
(Livingston 2005: 199)
And if the artist’s intentions do not mesh with the explicit features of the
text or artefact, they cannot be constitutive of work meaning. What I want to
show now is that Livingston’s own proposal for a standard of success is not
without its problems and difficulties.
II.
Here we see a little girl’s scribbled drawing:1
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1. Reduced in size. 
Many thanks to my 
little niece Nina for
her kind permission 
to reproduce her
splendid artwork.
2. I am not claiming
that the drawing
depicts a piano just
because the child 
had the intention to
depict a piano.
Richard Wollheim
(among others) has
argued convincingly
that intention is not 
a sufficient condition
for depiction
(Wollheim 1987). I 
do think, however,
that the child’s 
intention determines
what the drawing is
about. So, this is a
claim about meaning
or representation 
in the broad sense
rather than a claim
about depiction 
or pictorial 
representation. 
Figure 1.
If she tells us that this is a drawing of a dog, we would probably accept
her explanation and believe that that is what the drawing is about. But if she
tells us that the drawing represents her father (with one arm raised), we
would also accept that explanation and believe that that is what we are look-
ing at (the fact that there seem to be three legs and no neck wouldn’t
bother us too much). Or suppose she tells us that it’s the front yard, or a
piano, or grandma’s house: in all these cases we would probably regard her
intention as partly determinant of what the drawing is about.2 In other
words, we seem willing to take seriously almost any sincere explanation the
young artist may provide, independent of how well that explanation meshes
with the features of her drawing.
There is an easy explanation for this, the partial intentionalist might
reply. We accept almost any (sincere) explanation by the little girl simply
JVAP_7.1_07_art_Maes  7/8/08  2:43 PM  Page 87
because almost any explanation would mesh sufficiently with the totality of
evidence. However, taking this line seems to imply giving up the idea that
‘to mesh with’ means more than just ‘to be compatible with’. Recall that
Livingston’s success condition carries ‘the implication of a stronger condi-
tion involving relevance and integration’. Just what that might mean is
illustrated in the final chapter of Art and Intention, with the example of
István Svabó’s film Meeting Venus (1991). Various features of this film do
not really integrate or fit with Svabó’s intention to show that the redemp-
tive force of Tannhäuser arises from the sheer excellence of the music. So,
Livingston concludes, there is no sufficient meshing. However, the same is
obviously true in the example of the child’s drawing. Various elements of
the drawing do not fit with, say, the little girl’s intention to draw her father
(three legs, no neck). Should we conclude in this case as well that there is
no sufficient meshing and thus reject the child’s account of her own draw-
ing? As I have said, we seem inclined to do the opposite. Yet, if there is suf-
ficient meshing here, then why not in Meeting Venus; and how then defend
the claim that ‘to mesh sufficiently with’ means more than just ‘to be com-
patible with’?
The partial intentionalist is faced with a dilemma. If he decides to interpret
the meshing condition loosely, for instance by stating that the artist’s inten-
tions mesh sufficiently with the data if they reveal new connotations or con-
nections between various features of the work, it will not do the work it was
meant to do, viz. blocking ‘tacked on’ hypotheses like the Martian storyline in
the Soseki example. For even the most extravagant hypothesis will prove
revealing in this sense, if only enough effort is put into it.3 On the other hand,
if the meshing condition is interpreted more narrowly, as Livingston seems to
do in his discussion of Meeting Venus, it will prove too restrictive, excluding
intentions that we would normally regard as constitutive of a work’s meaning.
The example of the little girl’s drawing illustrates this.
One might object to this particular example, however, on the grounds
that conclusions regarding ‘child art’ have no relevance for ‘real art’. But
this manoeuvre is bound to fail as it is not so hard to come up with parallel
cases from the realm of ‘real art’. Consider some of Joseph Beuys’ works
where the connection between the displayed objects and the intended
meaning is no more significant than the connection between the little girl’s
drawing and her intention to draw her father. For example, we know from
interviews and direct statements of the artist that in Lightning with Stag in
its Glare (1985) a large bronze triangle was meant to embody the energy of
a powerful flash of lightning, an iron cart was meant to represent a goat and
strange shapes on the floor were intended as ‘primordial creatures’ refer-
ring to natural energies of the earth. Unless ‘to mesh with’ is interpreted so
broadly that it means no more than just ‘to be compatible with’, it seems
absurd to say that the artist’s intentions mesh quite well with the objects on
display. Nevertheless, the curators of the exhibition at the Tate Modern,
where this work was exhibited in 2006, accepted Beuys’ intentions as con-
stitutive of the work’s meaning. For the wall-text that accompanied the
work, they just took over the artist’s own explanation: ‘The cart represents a
goat, and the clods of bronze on the floor are primordial creatures. A small
compass, mounted on top of a box, is another reference, with the lightning
flash itself, to the natural energies of the earth’.4
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3. This point is nicely
demonstrated, in a
larger context, by 
conspiracy theories. 
If enough effort is put
into it, conspiracy 
theorists will always
manage to find 
some ‘revealing’ 
connections between
events that are totally
unrelated.
4. The wall-texts can
be found on the 
website of Tate
Modern (http://
www.tate.org.uk/
servlet/ViewWork?
workid=27008). 
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III.
The claim, that for an intention to be constitutive of work meaning it needs
to mesh with the totality of evidence, is not unproblematic. But what about
the ‘weaker’ and apparently uncontroversial claim that the artist’s inten-
tions need to be compatible with the totality of evidence?
Imagine a waiter pointing to an insect visibly floating in your soup and
saying ‘There’s a fly in your suit’. It is obvious that he meant to say that the
fly is in your soup, but that is not what he actually said. The easily recognizable
intention of the waiter does not determine the meaning of his utterance
because it is incompatible with the linguistic and conventional meanings of
the words. As Stecker (2003), to whom I owe this example, puts it, the
waiter fails to say what he intended to say because ‘soup’ is neither among
the literal meanings of the word ‘suit’, nor has an appropriate context been
established that gives the word ‘suit’ this extended meaning.
But suppose we modify the example a bit. Imagine a waiter pointing to
an insect visibly floating in your soup and saying ‘There’s a fly in your
floup’. Again, the waiter intended to say that there is a fly in your soup, but
that is not what he actually said. What did he say, then? What is the mean-
ing of the utterance: ‘There’s a fly in your floup’? According to Stecker (and
Livingston), ‘if the speaker’s intention is not successful, the meaning is
determined by convention and context at the time of utterance’ (Stecker
2004: 14). However, ‘floup’ does not have a conventional meaning. It is not
a proper English word. And while some philosophers would argue that in
the context of that specific conversation ‘floup’ just means ‘soup’, Stecker
and Livingston do not take this line. Thanks to the context, the hearer may
come to understand that the waiter wants to say something about the soup,
but ‘this understanding does not imply that the speaker has said what he
intends to say or that his utterance means what he intends to communi-
cate’ (Stecker 2004: 13). But should we conclude then that the waiter’s
utterance was completely meaningless? Or should we perhaps conclude,
with Iseminger, that there simply is no utterance here (Iseminger 1996:
322)? I must admit I’m not entirely comfortable with either conclusion.
Whatever conclusion we reach in this admittedly banal example will
have important implications for less banal cases in art and literary interpre-
tation. For there is an interesting parallel between the waiter’s strange use
of vocabulary and the idiosyncratic use of vocabulary by modernist poets
and novelists. In both cases, the intended meaning is (more or less) clear
to the appropriate public, but not compatible with the meaning of the word-
sequence produced. When James Joyce writes about ‘Dyoublong’ he is of
course referring to Dublin but also hinting at the phrase: ‘Do you belong?’5
Strictly speaking, however, this intended meaning is not compatible with
the linguistic and conventional meaning of the text. ‘Dyoublong’ simply
doesn’t have a conventional meaning. Or what to think of sentences like:
‘Why do I am alook alike a poss of porter pease?’ where Joyce wants us to
think of Piesporter wine, a request for a pint of porter, please, and the
expression ‘as like as two peas’ – all at the same time. Should we say that
this is a meaningless utterance? Or should we say, following Iseminger, that
since the word-sequence is without conventional meaning ‘we typically do
not have an utterance (or work) but rather a failure or a (nonverbal) joke of
some sort’ (Iseminger 1996: 322). Surely not.
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5. I borrow this and also
the next example from
Davidson’s ‘James
Joyce and Humpty
Dumpty’ published in
Truth, Language, and
History (Davidson
2005). 
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IV.
Gary Larson’s cartoon series The Far Side is widely known. Almost all of
these cartoons are very funny but occasionally there is a cartoon that has a
different effect on people. Take the notorious ‘Cow Tools’ cartoon (Larson
1989: 156). It displays a cow standing next to a workbench with tools that
look rather primitive. People were just puzzled by the cartoon. After ‘Cow
Tools’ appeared in newspapers in 1982, Larson got hundreds of letters from
people wanting to know the meaning of this cartoon, two of which were
reprinted in an anthology published on the tenth anniversary of The Far Side:
Enclosed is a copy of the ‘Cow Tools’ cartoon. I have passed it around. I have
posted it on the wall. Conservatively, some 40-odd professionals with doctoral
degrees in disparate disciplines have examined it. No one understands it.
Even my 6-year-old cannot figure it out…We are going bonkers. Please help.
What is the meaning of ‘Cow Tools’? – Reader, Texas
I represent a small band of Fellows from every walk of American Life, who
have been drawn together by a need to know, a need to understand… [we]
have been brought together by the absolute certainty that your cartoon cap-
tioned ‘Cow Tools’ means something. But, as this letter signifies, just what it
might mean has escaped us. – Reader, California
(Larson 1989: 157)
In the anniversary anthology, Larson answers the desperate pleas of his
readers. One day, he explains, he recalled an anthropology course he had
taken in college and how he learned that although man used to be defined
as ‘the only animal that made and shaped tools’, researchers had discov-
ered that certain primates and even some bird species did the same thing.
Almost as a matter of course, Larson says, he began thinking about his
favourite animals, cows, and what if they, too, were discovered as toolmakers.
This unlikely scenario struck him as absurdly funny. So he imagined, and
subsequently drew, a cow standing next to her workbench, proudly dis-
playing her primitive ‘hoofiwork’.
Reading this explanation, it’s natural to think: ‘So that’s what “Cow
Tools” is about’. I assume that’s how most readers would react. Now, if this
assumption is correct, it may count as strong evidence against hypothetical
intentionalism and in favour of actual intentionalism. For instead of sticking
with our best hypothesis of what this cartoon is about – whatever that
hypothesis may be – we do not hesitate to accept Larson’s own explanation.
In fact, the readers’ letters themselves seem to speak in favour of actual
intentionalism. The hypothetical intentionalist claims that ‘direct authorial
pronouncements of meaning can be set aside by the reader devoted to the
central job of interpretation’ (Levinson 1996: 208), but the letters show how
readers devoted to the central job of interpretation expressly desire authorial
pronouncements of meaning. They are ‘absolutely certain’ that the cartoon
means something and that Larson is in a position to help them out.
Still, ‘Cow Tools’ also raises a problem for Livingston’s partial intention-
alism. Moreover, the cartoon allows me to highlight a valuable aspect of
hypothetical intentionalism that is worth retaining. But before I get to that,
I want to draw attention to a minor, perhaps only terminological, issue.
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(i) Chapter six of Livingston’s book carries the title ‘Intention and the
Interpretation of Art’ and this expresses perfectly what the debate in aes-
thetics is about: the role of intention in the interpretation of art. However,
when we think of ‘Cow Tools’ and how we arrive at the meaning of this
cartoon, it seems that interpretation has very little to do with this. As
several participants in the debate have stressed, if one finds out the
meaning of a word by looking it up in a dictionary, one is not interpreting
(Davies 2006: 112; Stecker 2004: 4). Similarly, one could say that, if one
finds out the meaning of a cartoon or a work of art by reading a catalogue
or anthology, one is not interpreting either.6
If this is so, then perhaps we should say that the difference between the
actual and the hypothetical intentionalist’s response to ‘Cow Tools’ (and
similar cases in art), is not a difference in interpretation. To be sure, the
actual and hypothetical intentionalist end up disagreeing about the mean-
ing of the cartoon, but that is not because of a significant difference in
interpretive activity, but rather because the actual intentionalist accepts that
the artist’s clarification of his own intention can put an end to the interpre-
tive quest for the work’s meaning, in much the same way as a dictionary
can put an end to the search for a word’s meaning.
(ii) Larson’s elucidation gives us a better understanding of the cartoon,
but I doubt that many people will actually laugh once they know the
intended meaning. This seems true of cartoons and jokes in general. If we
don’t ‘get’ a joke, someone may explain it to us, but the explanation will
rarely result in spontaneous laughter. Thus, articulating the point of a joke
not only puts an end to interpretation, but also, characteristically, puts a
damper on the effect of the joke. The two even seem to be connected: there
is no effect because there is no interpretation. Let me clarify this further.
Although jokes generally take the form of a riddle or a short story, there
is a feature that distinguishes them from ‘ordinary’ riddles or short stories,
namely the punchline. As Noël Carroll points out,
a punchline is not simply a matter of neatly answering the question posed by
a riddle nor of drawing all the storylines of a narrative to a summation. Rather,
the punchline concludes the joke with an unexpected puzzle whose solution
is left to the listener to resolve.…What the listener must do at the end of a
joke is to provide an interpretation, i.e., to make sense of the last line of the
text in light of the salient elements of the preceding narrative or riddle.
(Carroll 1991: 286)
Precisely because the listener himself has to come up with an interpretation
to solve the puzzle of the last line, the solution will be all the more striking
to him (hence the ‘punch’ of the punchline). If, by contrast, the listener is
unable to solve the puzzle himself, and someone else has to explain it, that
effect – things falling suddenly into place producing spontaneous laughter –
will largely disappear.
This analysis also applies to cartoons – just think of The Far Side where
the caption often fulfils the role of the punchline, creating a puzzle that the
reader needs to solve. Likewise, there are clear cases of art-with-a-punch-
line. Duchamp’s LHOOQ (1919) is a famous example. Or take the film
Citizen Kane (1941) and its central plotline, the search for the meaning of
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6. Especially in 
contemporary art,
there are many works
similar to ‘Cow Tools’
where even the
appropriate audience
is completely in the
dark regarding the
meaning. Here is just
one example: ‘A
distance separates
object from argument
in Ghada Amer’s
Untitled ( John Rose).
Her paintings look,
the catalogue
concedes, “like finely
drawn, delicate
abstractions”. The
informed eye leads
one to surmise that
her work shows the
influence of Cy
Twombly. But as with
Calame’s work, the
eye is a very poor
guide to what we in
fact see. First, the
lines are not drawn 
or painted but sewn.
Second, the forms are
not abstract but
derived from images
of women in
pornographic
magazines. One can,
once instructed, see
that these are 
stitchings, but I found
it as difficult to make
out that I was 
looking at “sexually
suggestive postures”
as I did to identify as
female body parts –
cut from the same
genre of magazines –
the things with which
the Holy Virgin Mary
is surrounded in
Chris Ofili’s
controversial painting
from the Brooklyn
“Sensation” show. In
any case, Amer is
making, by means of
stitched prurient
imagery, some 
statement about the
representation of
women. One would
not know this without
help’ (Danto 2005).
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the word ‘Rosebud’. In the very last scene of the movie we get to see what
‘Rosebud’ refers to, but it is still up to us to interpret this surprising image.
The ending makes such a strong impression precisely because we gradually
come to grasp the full meaning of this revelation. A child who is unable to
make the right interpretation may ask us to explain what it is all about and
our explanation may give her some idea, but the film will definitely not have
the same effect on her as it had on us.
Of course, not all works of art depend on a similar ‘punchline mecha-
nism’ (landscape paintings, portraits, etc.), and those that do are usually
not completely dependent on it (there are so many other elements in
Citizen Kane that make it a great movie). Still, it is enough that some
aspects of some artworks can be understood along these lines to see the
relevance of the above analysis.
Just like jokes and cartoons, art-with-a-punchline will not have the
desired effect if the audience is unable to solve the puzzle posed by the
work of art. Naturally, this does not imply that the work is a failure. The fact
that a child spectator is unimpressed by Citizen Kane does not mean that
there is something wrong with the film. There is rather something wrong
with the spectator, or, to put it more accurately, children are not the appro-
priate audience for a film like Citizen Kane. Similarly, when you tell a mathe-
matics joke to an audience that does not know anything about mathematics
and the joke falls flat, that does not mean that the joke is bad. However, if
you tell the mathematics joke to an audience of mathematicians who have
all the relevant background information, and even they do not understand
the joke, then we would probably conclude that there is something
wrong with the joke. This, I want to argue, is exactly what happened
with ‘Cow Tools’. If even ‘40-odd professionals with doctoral degrees in
disparate disciplines’ and ‘Fellows from every walk of American Life, who
have been drawn together by a need to know’ do not understand what the
cartoon is about, then the natural conclusion is that something went wrong
with the cartoon. Larson himself comes to this conclusion. He does not
blame the audience for their perplexity, he blames himself. He should have
made the point of ‘Cow Tools’ more clear. ‘Nothing’, he says, ‘is perhaps
more frustrating in this business than to open a newspaper, turn to your
own little creation, and discover that some idiot has screwed it all up, and
discover that that idiot was you [original emphasis]’ (Larson 1989: 121).
All this demonstrates that some insights and aspects of hypothetical
intentionalism are worth keeping and can be of use to the actual intention-
alist. Firstly, we should hold on to the notion of the appropriate audience –
a notion that plays no role in partial intentionalism, but is a key ingredient
of hypothetical intentionalism.7 That notion is important, but not so much
because it is crucial in determining the meaning of a work, but because it is
crucial to its evaluation and appreciation. If a joke, cartoon or artwork-with-
a-punchline does not have the desired effect, we need the notion of an
appropriate audience to determine whether the problem lies with the audi-
ence or with the work itself.
Secondly, where jokes, cartoons or art-with-a-punchline are concerned,
the hypothetical intentionalist is perfectly right in claiming that ‘[t]he work, if
any good, will stand on its own, without the author on hand to explain regu-
larly what he meant’ (Levinson 1996: 206). The hypothetical intentionalist is
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7. According to
Levinson, for instance,
‘the core meaning of
a literary work is 
given by the best
hypothesis, from the
position of an appro-
priately informed,
sympathetic and
discriminating reader,
of authorial intent’
(Levinson 1999: 14).
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wrong, however, in thinking that this holds for all works of art and that it is ‘a
ground rule’ for determining work meaning ‘that direct authorial pronounce-
ments of meaning can be set aside by the reader’ (Levinson 1996: 208). Even
in the example of ‘Cow Tools’, a cartoon that is justly considered a failure
because it cannot ‘stand on its own’, readers consider direct authorial pro-
nouncements highly relevant for the meaning of the work.
(iii) Most people would see Larson’s intentions regarding the implicit
content of ‘Cow Tools’ as partly constitutive of the cartoon’s meaning.
Livingston’s partial intentionalism can account for this. Larson’s intentions
are not only compatible with the features of the cartoon as a whole, they
also mesh sufficiently with those features, in every sense of the word. They
bear a ‘meaningful, integrative relation with them’ and open up ‘previously
undetected connotations’. So, Livingston’s success condition is fully satis-
fied. Nevertheless, a problem seems to arise. For isn’t it rather awkward to
say that Larson’s intentions were successfully realized in the case of ‘Cow
Tools’? Indeed, Larson would be the first to admit that they were not. So, we
seem to come to a paradoxical conclusion: Larson did not successfully real-
ize his intentions, but his intentions are nonetheless partly constitutive of
the cartoon’s meaning.
One way to go from here would be to accept this as a fact and give up
the project of finding success conditions for intentions. Intentions, one
might argue, simply do not need to be successfully realized in order to be
(partly) constitutive of work meaning.8
Another, and in my view more promising response would be to hold on
to the idea that intentions can only be constitutive of work meaning if they
are successfully realized, and to argue that the paradox is the result of con-
fusing different kinds of intentions. As Donald Davidson points out in
‘Locating Literary Language’: ‘we can speak of “the” intention with which an
act is performed only by narrowing attention to one among the tangle of
intentions involved in any performance’ (Davidson 2005: 170). A particularly
useful distinction in this regard is the distinction between the intention to
say something and the intention to communicate something. Stecker makes
this distinction to clarify what happens in malapropisms like ‘There’s a fly in
your suit’ (Stecker 2004: 11). Here, he says, the intention to communicate is
successful, but the intention to say something is not. In ‘Cow Tools’, one
might argue, the opposite is true. Here we have an unsuccessful intention to
communicate, though we might agree that the cartoon actually means what
Larson intended it to mean. Thus, Larson’s intention to create a meaningful
cartoon is successful, but his intention to get his point across and make
people laugh is not, which explains his dissatisfaction with the result.
V.
According to Livingston, the artist’s intentions are successfully realized and
hence determinant of the meaning of a work if and only if they are compat-
ible and ‘mesh’ with the linguistic and conventional meanings of the text or
artefact taken in its target or intended context. In this paper I have tried to
show that this specific standard of success is not without its difficulties.
First, I have argued that an artist’s intention can sometimes be constitutive
of a work’s meaning even if there is no significant meshing between the
artist’s intention and his work. Secondly, I have contested the apparently
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8. If this seems a strange
idea, think of actions.
Intentions often 
determine the 
meaning of an action,
even if the intentions
are not successfully
realized (‘He was
stealing, but
fortunately we caught
him before he took
anything valuable’).
Livingston’s own 
distinction between
executing and
realizing an 
intention may 
also be helpful here
(Livingston 2005: 11). 
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uncontroversial claim that the artist’s intentions need to be compatible
with the linguistic and conventional meanings of a text. Thirdly, I have pre-
sented a case that creates a puzzle for the partial intentionalist because the
intentions of the artist concerned are not successfully realized, though they
are compatible and mesh with all the relevant data. I have concluded my
paper by suggesting a solution to this puzzle.
This paper does not show that the project of moderate actual intention-
alism is fatally flawed. As I indicated at the beginning of my essay, I am
actually convinced that moderate actual intentionalism is superior to most
rival views, including hypothetical intentionalism. Nevertheless, I have
argued that some aspects of hypothetical intentionalism, in particular the
notion of the appropriate audience, can be of use to the partial intentionalist
and should be retained in the further elaboration of partial intentionalism.
Furthermore, I believe that the objections I have raised do pose genuine
difficulties for the partial intentionalist – difficulties that need to be overcome
in order to arrive at a truly convincing account of the specific role of the
artist’s intention in the interpretation of art.9
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